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Abstract
This paper compares optimal financial contracts with centralized and decentralized
firms. Under centralized contracting headquarters raises funds on behalf of multiple
projects and then allocates the funds on the firm’s internal capital market. Under decen-
tralized contracting each project raises funds separately on the external capital market.
The benefit of centralization is that headquarters can use excess liquidity from high-cash
flow projects to buy continuation rights for low cash-flow projects. This allows headquar-
ters to make greater repayments to investors, which eases financing constraints ex ante.
The cost is that headquarters may pool cash flows from several projects, thereby accumu-
late internal funds, and make follow-up investments without having to return to the capital
market. Absent any capital market discipline, however, it is more diﬃcult for investors to
force headquarters to pay out funds, which tightens ex-ante financing constraints.
Keywords: Financial contracting; internal capital markets; theory of the firm.
JEL Classification Numbers: D32; G31; G32; G34.
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1 Introduction
Beginning with Fazarri, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), several papers have documented
that the investment behavior of firms is aﬀected by financing constraints.1 While it is
commonly argued that financing constraints are caused by market imperfections such as
moral hazard or asymmetric information, little is known about the extent to which firms
can actively mitigate financing constraints through their organizational structure. In this
paper we examine whether financial contracts with centralized firms where headquarters
raises funds on behalf of multiple projects are more eﬃcient than contracts with stand-
alone firms, and how this translates into the firm’s financing constraint.
Hints on the role which centralization may play for financing constraints are found
in the internal capital markets literature. There, headquarters either creates or destroys
value inside the firm, e.g., by engaging in winner-picking (Stein 1997), by redeploying
assets (Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein 1994), or by aﬀecting project managers’ incentives
(Stein 2000). Naturally, this value creation or destruction will aﬀect the return to cap-
ital and hence also the firm’s financing constraint. As none of these papers adopts an
optimal contracting approach, the precise nature and magnitude of the eﬀect remains un-
clear, however.2 On the other hand, financial contracting models, while deriving financing
constraints and the associated underinvestment problem from first principles, typically
consider an entrepreneurial firm where the entrepreneur raises funds for a single project.
In this setting, questions of organizational structure cannot be addressed.
This paper connects the internal capital markets literature with that on optimal fi-
nancial contracting, thus tying together in- and external capital markets. We compare
financial contracting between i) outside investors and individual project managers (“de-
centralized borrowing”) and ii) outside investors and headquarters, which borrows on
behalf of multiple projects and subsequently allocates the funds on the firm’s internal
capital market (“centralized borrowing”). Financing constraints arise endogenously from
the assumption that part of the project cash flow is nonverifiable. The crux is to provide
the firm (i.e., the project manager or headquarters) with incentives to pay out funds rather
than to divert them. To distinguish our model from others we assume that headquarters
1See Hubbard (1998) for an overview of the literature.
2Stein (1997) rules out optimal contracting by assuming that it is too costly to elicit managers’ private
information. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) assume that outside investors can only decide on the size of
their investment and the firm’s operating budget. In particular, contracts contingent on (reported) cash
flows are not considered. Finally, Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) consider optimal contracts, but
not between headquarters and outside investors. More precisely, the authors compare contracting between
project managers and investors under two scenarios: i) the manager owns the project and ii) the investor
owns the project. In the latter case they call the investor “headquarters”. The possibility that headquarters
itself may have to raise funds from outside investors is not explored.
3
creates or destroys no value as such. That is, there is no winner-picking, managerial eﬀort,
or misallocation of funds inside the firm.
The benefit of centralization is that financial contracts with centralized firms are more
eﬃcient. To make the firm reval its true cash flow, investors must oﬀer it a bribe. Bribes
can come either in the form of a lower repayment or a higher continuation benefit. Under
centralized borrowing a greater fraction of the bribe comes in the form of continuation
benefits, which is eﬃcient as it involves undertaking positive NPV investments that would
have not been undertaken otherwise. Eﬀectively, headquarters uses excess liquidity from
high cash-flow projects to buy continuation rights for low cash-flow projects. This allows
headquarters to make greater repayments to investors, which eases financing constraints
ex ante. The cost of centralization is that headquarters may pool cash flows from several
projects, thereby accumulate internal funds, and make follow-up investments without
having to return to the capital market. Absent any capital market discipline, it is more
diﬃcult for investors to force the firm to pay out funds, which tightens ex-ante financing
constraints. This last point is reminiscent of Jensen (1986), where the problem is also
that firms can invest without having to revisit the capital market. Our model adopts an
ex-ante perspective: anticipating that a free cash-flow problem may arise in the future,
investors are reluctant to provide financing in the first place.
Based on these costs and benefits, we trace out the boundaries of the firm. Holding
everything else fixed, centralization is optimal for projects with a low expected return, or
productivity, while decentralization is optimal for projects with a high expected return.
Cross-sectionally, this implies that conglomerates should have a lower average productivity
than stand-alone firms. Moreover, we provide testable implications linking financing con-
straints to operating productivity, the degree of firm diversification, and the composition
of the firm’s investment portfolio.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the costs and benefits of
centralization in an optimal contracting framework. Section 3 discusses robustness issues
and related literature. Section 4 contains various extensions of the basic model. Section
5 summarizes the empirical implications and contrasts them with the evidence. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Centralized vs. Decentralized Borrowing
The Model
The model is a multi-period contracting model with partially non-verifiable cash flows
in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), DeMarzo and Fishman (2000), Gertner,
Scharfstein, and Stein (1994), and Hart and Moore (1998). While the basic formulation
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here follows Bolton and Scharfstein, none of the results depend on the specifics of their
model. In Section 3 we show that the same tradeoﬀ also obtains in a Hart-Moore (1998)
type framework.
Suppose a project lasts for two periods. In each period it requires an investment
outlay I > 0 and yields an end-of-period cash flow πl < I with probability p > 0 and
πh > I with probability 1− p, where πh > πl. Cash flows are uncorrelated across periods.
Instead of assuming that a project lasts for two periods we could equally imagine two
separate, but technologically identical (sub-)projects that are carried out one after the
other. The expected per-period cash flow net of investment costs is strictly positive, i.e.,
π := pπl + (1− p)πh > I.
Suppose a firm has two such two-period projects. For the moment we assume that cash
flows are uncorrelated across projects. In Section 4 we relax this assumption. As the firm
has no funds it must raise funds from outside investors. For convenience we assume there
is a single investor who makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the firm. While the assumption
that there is a single investor may seem unrealistic, it is inconsequential for our results.
The only reason for making this assumption is that it simplifies the contracting problem.
In Section 3 we discuss competitive credit markets.
The firm’s founder can choose between two organizational structures, which diﬀer in
their assignment of projects to managers. Under centralized borrowing a single manager
called headquarters is in charge of both projects. Under decentralized borrowing a separate
project manager is in charge of each project. We use the standard assumption that agents
in charge of projects maximize the cash proceeds from projects under their control, e.g.,
because they derive private benefits that are proportional to these proceeds. As projects
require no monitoring or managerial eﬀort, but only capital, the question is therefore
whether the founder should form one firm where headquarters borrows on behalf of both
projects or two separate firms that borrow independently on the external capital market.
While the problem is framed as an organizational design problem, it could be equally
framed as a divestiture problem where a conglomerate contemplates spinning oﬀ one of
its divisions. The model and results are the same.
Neither cash flows nor investment decisions are verifiable, which implies contracts
can only condition on payments to and from the investor as well as public messages.3
The assumption that cash flows are nonverifiable is standard and captures the idea that
firms have some leeway to conceal profits. The assumption that investment decisions are
3As we adopt a message-game approach it is irrelevant whether cash flows and investment decisions are
observable but nonverifiable, or whether insiders (i.e., project managers or headquarters) can observe cash
flows and investment decisions but outsiders cannot. We may therefore equally assume that cash flows
and investment decisions are privately observable.
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nonverifiable simplifies the analysis but is not needed. In Section 3 we show that the
same tradeoﬀ obtains in a setting where investment decisions are verifiable. Finally, even
though courts cannot observe actual cash flows, it is commonly known that the lowest
possible cash flow is πl. Hence we may alternatively assume that a fraction πl of the cash
flow is verifiable and only the diﬀerence πh − πl is nonverifiable.
Under both centralized and decentralized borrowing the partial nonverifiability of cash
flows creates an incentive problem between the firm and the investor. Under centralized
borrowing the problem is to provide headquarters with incentives to pay out funds (rather
than to divert them). Under decentralized borrowing the problem is to provide individual
project managers with incentives to pay out funds. With regard to centralized borrowing
there are two subcases, depending on whether a high cash-flow firm can (partly) self-
finance second-period investment or not. We label these subcases “self-financing” and “no
self-financing”, respectively.
Decentralized Borrowing
This is our benchmark. Under decentralized borrowing each of the two project man-
agers borrows separately on the external capital market. As the contracting problem is
the same for each manager, we henceforth speak of the manager and the project. The
standard way to deal with nonverifiability of cash flows is to adopt a message-game ap-
proach. In the present context, this means that after the cash flow is realized, the manager
makes a publicly verifiable announcement stating that the cash flow is either low or high.
The sequence of events is as follows:
• Date 0: the investor pays I and the manager (optimally) invests.
• Date 1: the manager announces that the first-period cash flow is sˆ ∈ {l, h} . Based
on this announcement, the manager makes a first repayment R1 (sˆ) , and the investor
finances second-period investment, i.e., he pays I a second time, with probability
β (sˆ) . If the manager receives I, he again (optimally) invests.
• Date 2: based on the date 1-announcement, the manager makes a second repayment
R2 (sˆ) .
Two comments are in order. Like most financial contracting models, we allow for prob-
abilistic (re-)financing schemes to permit nontrivial solutions. If the continuation proba-
bility can be either zero or one the qualitative results are the same, but the benefits from
centralization are smaller. Second, while it is theoretically possible to have the manager
also announce the second-period cash flow (in case he receives funding at date 1), this is
pointless as he will always claim that the second-period cash flow is low. By contrast, it
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is possible to induce the manager to truthfully reveal the first-period cash flow by threat-
ening him not to provide second-period financing. An implicit assumption herein is that,
if the manager of a high cash-flow firm claims that the cash flow is low, he cannot use
the remaining cash to self-finance second-period investment. If he could, the investor’s
threat to terminate funding would be empty and financing would break down completely.
Formally, the assumption is
(A.1) πh − πl < I.
Recall that the investor can always extract πl. An immediate implication of (A.1) is
that πl > 0, or else the assumption that πh > I is violated. The optimal financial contract
is then the solution to the following problem:
max
β(s),R1(s),R2(s)
−I + p
h
R1 (l) + β (l)
³
R2 (l)− I
´i
+(1− p)
h
R1 (h) + β (h)
³
R2 (h)− I
´i
s.t.
r (s)−R1 (s) + β (s)
h
π −R2 (s)
i
≥ r (s)−R1 (sˆ) + β (sˆ)
h
π −R2 (sˆ)
i
for all s, sˆ ∈ {l, h} ,
R1 (s) ≤ r (s) for all s ∈ {l, h} , (1)
and
R2 (s) ≤ r (s)−R1 (s) + πl for all s ∈ {l, h} , (2)
where r (l) := πl and r (h) := πh.
The first constraint is the manager’s incentive compatibility (or truthtelling) con-
straint. The remaining two constraints are limited liability constraints. The first states
that the first-period repayment must not exceed the first-period cash flow, while the sec-
ond states that the total repayment must not exceed the sum of first- and second-period
cash flows. Whenever (1)-(2) are satisfied, the manager’s individual rationality constraint
is also satisfied, which is why it can be omitted.
From Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) we know that the solution to this sort of problem
is β (l) = 0, β (h) = 1, R1 (l) = R2 (h) = πl, and R1 (h) = π. If the manager announces
that the first-period cash flow is high, he receives second-period financing for sure. If he
announces that the cash flow is low, he receives no second-period financing.
The optimal contract involves two types of ineﬃciencies. First, with probability p the
second-period investment is not undertaken. Despite this ineﬃciency, however, there will
be no renegotiation on the equilibrium path as the maximum which the investor can assure
in the second period is πl < I. Second, if we insert the optimal contract in the investor’s
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objective function and solve for the value of I at which he breaks even, we have that the
investor invests at date 0 if and only if
I ≤ π − π − πl
2− p . (3)
Projects that cost less than π but more than the right-hand side in (3) receive no funding
at date 0 even though they have a strictly positive NPV. In other words, the firm is
financially constrained.
Centralized Borrowing: No Self-Financing
Under centralized borrowing headquarters borrows against the combined cash flow of
the two projects. The relevant cash flow is therefore r (l, l) := 2πl with probability p2,
r (l, h) := πl+πh with probability 2p (1− p) , and r (h, h) := 2πh with probability (1− p)2.
The sequence of events is the same as under decentralized borrowing.
As a contract now encompasses two projects, the contracting space becomes larger.
In particular, the investor may use separate refinancing probabilities β1 (sˆ) and β2 (sˆ) for
each of the two second-period projects, which implies he will end up refinancing either
zero, one, or two projects. As can be shown, any such contract is equivalent to a contract
where the investor uses a common refinancing probability for both second-period projects.
(The argument rests on risk neutrality). Without loss of generality, we may thus assume
that the investor pays 2I with probability β (sˆ) at date 1.
We finally need to specifiy what the firm’s self-financing possibilities are if a high
cash-flow firm falsely claims that the cash flow is low. Given (A.1) there are only two
possibilities: i) 2 (πh − πl) < I, in which case the firm cannot self-finance at all, and ii)
2I > 2 (πh − πl) > I, in which case a high cash-flow firm can make one, but only one,
second-period investment without returning to the capital market. If a high cash-flow firm
could self-finance both second-period projects (A.1) would be violated, i.e., the investor
would have no threat and financing would break down completely.
We begin with the case where self-financing is not possible. As we shall argue below,
this case is less realistic if a firm has many projects. Still, it is useful to consider this case
as there centralized borrowing has benefits but no costs, which provides an undistorted
picture of the benefits of centralization. If self-financing is possible, these benefits will be
weighed against the costs of self-financing. Formally, the assumption that self-financing is
not possible is
(A.2) 2 (πh − πl) < I.
In what follows we assume that (A.1)-(A.2) holds.
The problem under centralized borrowing is to provide headquarters with incentives to
reveal the true cash flow. Denote the set of possible cash flows by S := {(l, l) , (l, h) , (h, h)} .
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The investor solves
max
β(s),R1(s),R2(s)
−2I + p2
h
R1 (l, l) + β (l, l)
³
R2 (l, l)− 2I
´i
(4)
+2p (1− p)
h
R1 (h, l) + β (h, l)
³
R2 (h, l)− 2I
´i
+(1− p)2
h
R1 (h, h) + β (h, h)
³
R2 (h, h)− 2I
´i
s.t.
r (s)−R1 (s) + β (s)
h
2π −R2 (s)
i
(5)
≥ r (s)−R1 (sˆ) + β (sˆ)
h
2π −R2 (sˆ)
i
for all s, sˆ ∈ S,
R1 (s) ≤ r (s) for all s ∈ S, (6)
and
R2 (s) ≤ r (s)−R1 (s) + 2πl for all s ∈ S. (7)
The individual rationality constraint can be again omitted as it is implied by the stronger
limited liability constraints (6)-(7).
The optimal contract is derived in the Appendix. In the low and high cash-flow
state the optimal contract is the same as under decentralized borrowing, except that all
payments are multiplied by two. We thus have β (l, l) = 0, R1 (l, l) = 2πl, β (h, h) = 1,
R1 (h, h) = 2π, and R2 (h, h) = 2πl. If both first-period cash flows are low, the firm obtains
no second-period financing while if both first-period cash flows are high, the firm obtains
second-period financing for sure. In the intermediate case where one cash flow is low and
the other is high the optimal contract is either identical to that of the high cash-flow firm
(if p ≥ 1/2), or it has β (h, l) = 1/ [2 (1− p)] > 1/2, R1 (h, l) = πh+πl, and R2 (h, l) = 2πl
(if p ≤ 1/2). The case distinction is due to the fact that for p ≥ 1/2 the limited liability
constraint (7) is slack. By contrast, if p < 1/2 the constraint binds, which means the
investor extracts the maximum possible date-1 repayment.
The only cash-flow state where centralization makes a diﬀerence is thus the interme-
diate state where one cash flow is low and the other is high. In this state the refinancing
probability is strictly greater than one half. By contrast, the average refinancing probabil-
ity under decentralized borrowing is [β (h) + β (l)] /2 = 1/2. We may therefore conclude
that the first type of ineﬃciency, viz., that eﬃcient second-period investments are not
undertaken, is less severe if borrowing is centralized.
If we insert the optimal contract in the investor’s objective function (4) and solve for
the value of I at which he breaks even, we obtain that the investor invests at date 0 if and
only if
I ≤ π − π − πl
2− p+ p2 (8)
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if p ≤ 1/2, and
I ≤ π − π − πl
2− p2 (9)
if p ≥ 1/2. Comparing (8)-(9) with the corresponding value under decentralized borrowing,
(3), we have that the second type of ineﬃciency, viz., that positive NPV projects are not
financed at date 0, is also less severe under centralized borrowing. This holds for any value
of p. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. If (A.1 )-(A.2 ) hold, centralized borrowing is optimal for all p. That
is, it is optimal to have headquarters borrow on behalf of both projects and subsequently
allocate the funds on the firm’s internal capital market rather than have each project borrow
separately on the external capital market.
The superiority of centralization vis-a-vis decentralization is not based on a superior
allocation of funds to projects inside the firm. At date 1 the two projects are identical
in every respect. Hence there is no scope for winner-picking. Rather, the superiority of
centralization derives from the fact that incentives for revealing the true date-1 cash flow
can be provided more eﬃciently.
The argument proceeds in two steps. As contracts in the high and low cash-flow state
are the same under centralized and decentralized borrowing, we can restrict attention to
the intermediate state where one cash flow is low and the other is high. To facilitate the
exposition, we first derive some preliminary results. When thinking about whether to
reveal the true cash flow, the intermediate and high cash-flow firm compares the payoﬀ
from truthtelling with that from mimicking the low cash-flow firm. To make mimicking
as costly as possible, the investor sets β (l) = 0 and R1 (l) = πl (under decentralized
borrowing) and β (l, l) = 0 and R1 (l, l) = 2πl (under centralized borrowing). Moreover,
it is evidently optimal to set R2 (h) = πl and R2 (h, l) = R2 (h, h) = 2πl, which means the
firm must pay out its entire verifiable date-2 cash flow.
Consider now the high cash-flow firm’s incentive compatibility constraint under decen-
tralized borrowing:
πh −R1 (h)| {z }
first-period rent
+ β (h) [π − πl]| {z }
continuation benefit
≥ πh − πl.
The right-hand side depicts the payoﬀ from mimicking the low cash-flow firm. Accordingly,
to induce the high cash-flow firm to reveal its cash flow, the investor must leave the firm
a rent of πh − πl. (This rent is usually called information rent). There are two ways to
provide this rent: i) by demanding a lower date-1 repayment R1 (h), or ii) by oﬀering a
higher continuation benefit β (h) [π − πl]. From an eﬃciency standpoint ii) is superior as it
minimizes the probability of ineﬃcient termination. The solution is therefore to provide as
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much rent as possible in the form of continuation benefits. As the maximum continuation
benefit under decentralized borrowing is π − πl, the remainder πh − π must be provided
in the form of first-period rent, i.e., in the form of a lower date-1 repayment.
Consider next the intermediate cash-flow firm under centralized borrowing. Its (down-
ward) incentive compatibility constraint is
πh + πl −R1 (h, l)| {z }
first-period rent
+ β (h, l) 2 [π − πl]| {z }
continuation benefit
≥ πh − πl.
The total rent that must be left to the intermediate cash-flow firm is again πh − πl.
Unlike above, however, the investor can now provide a continuation benefit of up to
2 [π − πl]. The continuation benefit actually provided is either 2 [π − πl] (if p ≥ 1/2)
or πh − πl (if p < 1/2), which is both strictly greater than the corresponding value
under decentralized borrowing. This is what constitutes the fundamental advantage of
centralized over decentralized borrowing. While the total information rent is the same under
centralized and decentralized borrowing, its composition is diﬀerent. Under decentralized
borrowing the continuation decision concerns only one project, which means a relatively
large fraction of the rent must come in the form of first-period rent. By contrast, under
centralized borrowing the continuation decision concerns two projects, which means most
(if p ≥ 1/2), or even all (if p < 1/2) of the rent can be provided in the form of continuation
benefits. Our result that centralization improves contract eﬃciency is robust in various
ways. It holds if the state space is continuous (Section 3), if the investor makes no loss in
the second period (Section 3), and if cash flows are correlated (Section 4).
Another way to view the tradeoﬀ between first- and second-period rents is in terms of
financial slack. Any nonverifiable date-1 cash flow retained in the firm represents unused
liquidity: eﬃciency could be improved by trading it in for continuation rights. Consider
the high cash-flow firm under decentralized borrowing. After trading in π − πl, which
equals the continuation benefit from its second-period investment, the firm’s remaining
liquidity is π − πl. If the high cash-flow manager were to share this excess liquidity with
the low cash-flow firm, the latter could trade it in for continuation rights. But as each
firm cares only about its own continuation decision, this does not happen.4
Under centralized borrowing this externality problem does not arise. As headquarters
adopts a firm-wide perspective it does not care which of the two projects produces the cash
flow. Eﬀectively, headquarters uses liquidity produced by the high cash-flow project to
4What if the two firms write an insurance contract at date 0? Due to the nonverifiability of cash flows
the high cash-flow firm must earn a rent of πh − πl. If the insurance contract were to oblige the high
cash-flow firm to share this rent with the low cash-flow firm, the former would not reveal its true cash flow
in the first place. Hence any incentive compatible contract between the two firms must lead to exactly the
same allocation as here.
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buy continuation rights for the low cash-flow project. (This also explains why the benefits
only arise in the intermediate cash-flow state). Note that a financial intermediary such
as, e.g., a bank cannot do this as it does not have direct access to the firms’ cash flow.
Much like the investor under decentralized borrowing, a bank would have to provide the
high cash-flow firm with incentives to disgorge cash.
Finally, consider the “no self-financing” assumption (A.2) and replace 2 by n. For
suficiently large n the inequality breaks down. In other words, the more projects there are
under one roof, the more likely is it that the firm can undertake at least one second-period
investment without returning to the capital market. We now come to the more realistic
scenario where partial self-financing is possible.
Centralized Borrowing: Self-Financing
In the context of this model, self-financing means that if both date-1 cash flows are
high, headquarters can undertake one second-period investment without having to raise
funds from the capital market. We replace (A.2) by
(A.3) 2I > 2 (πh − πl) ≥ I.
In what follows we assume that (A.1) and (A.3) hold.
The fact that a high cash-flow firm can partly self-finance second-period investment
tightens the firm’s incentive compatibility constraint. In the absence of self-financing, the
payoﬀ from mimicking a low cash-flow firm is 2 (πh − πl) . However, if the firm can invest
the retained cash in a second-period project, the payoﬀ from mimicking a low cash-flow
firm becomes 2 (πh − πl) + π − I. To induce the high cash-flow firm not to mimick a low
cash-flow firm, the investor must now additionally compensate the firm for the foregone
profit of π− I. The more general idea is that, by pooling cash flows from several projects,
centralized firms may accumulate internal funds and make follow-up investments without
having to return to the capital market. This weakens the investor’s termination threat,
which in turn tightens financing constraints ex ante.
If we solve the investor’s expected profit for the value of I at which he breaks even,
we have that the investor invests at date 0 if and only if
I ≤ π − π − πl
1 + p+ (1−p)
2
2
, (10)
if p ≤ 1/2, and
I ≤ π − π − πl
1 + 2p (1− p) + (1−p)22
(11)
if p ≥ 1/2. Comparing (10)-(11) with the corresponding value under decentralized bor-
rowing, (3), we obtain the following result.
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Proposition 2. If (A.1 ) and (A.3 ) hold, centralized borrowing where headquarters
borrows on behalf of both projects is optimal if p ≥ √2− 1. By contrast, if p ≤ √2− 1 it
is optimal to have each project borrow separately on the external capital market.
Self-financing makes it more costly for the investor to induce the firm to reveal its true
cash flow, which is captured by the additional “bribe” π−I in the high cash-flow state. The
costs of centralization thus depend on the distribution of cash flows in two ways. First, the
probability of the high cash-flow state is decreasing in p. Second, the additional bribe in
this state is also decreasing in p. Proposition 2 shows that if p is suﬃciently small, the costs
of centralization outweigh the benefits. To relax financing constraints, the firm should then
optimally decentralize, or what is equivalent, disintegrate. As a single-project firm does
not generate enough funds to self-finance second-period investment, it must necessarily
revisit the capital market. Hence decentralization acts as a credible commitment vis-a-vis
investors to stay on a tight leash.5 The notion that firms may benefit from committing to
a policy of revisiting the capital market is not new and has been used as an explanation
for, e.g., why firms pay dividends (Easterbrook 1984) or issue debt (Jensen 1986). In
showing that a firm’s organizational structure may act as a commitment to revisit the
capital market, our argument complements these arguments.
Finally, the investor cannot legally prevent the firm from self-financing as both cash
flows and investment decisions are nonverifiable. While the assumption that investment
decisions are nonverifiable may be realistic in some cases, in particular if the firm consists
of a complex bundle of investments where it is diﬃcult for outsiders to ascertain whether
the i−th investment has been made or not, it is less realistic in other cases. In Section 3
we show that the assumption that investment decisions are nonverifiable is not needed if
the parties can renegotiate after default.
Proposition 2 admits an alternative interpretation which goes beyond the issue of
financing constraints. It applies to settings where managers can withhold cash flow from
both investors and the firm’s owner(s). This may be because managers are better informed
or ownership is dispersed, implying that shareholders, while having formal control rights,
have insuﬃcient incentives to enforce their claims. Under this scenario the firm’s founder
is in the same boat as the investor: unless management can be incentivized to pay out
cash, neither the investor nor the founder will see any of it. The contract underlying
Proposition 2 remains optimal in this setting as it maximizes the cash flow extracted by
outsiders. The boundaries of the firm also remain the same.
5 If both first-period cash flows are high, the two firms have a strong incentive to re-merge at date 1.
To commit not to merge again, the firms may write a covenant into their debt contract restricting merger
activity. Such covenants are common. For instance, Smith and Warner (1979) find that 39.1% of the
public debt issues in their sample include covenants restricting merger activity.
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3 General Discussion
Continuous Cash-Flow Distribution
The argument that one project may not generate enough cash to allow self-financing
but two projects may is evidently independent of the cash-flow distribution. This is not
so obvious with regard to the benefits of centralization, i.e., the argument that financial
contracts with centralized firms are more eﬃcient.
Suppose cash flows are continuously distributed with support [πl,πh]. Consider first
the case where borrowing is decentralized. It is easily shown that the optimal contract has
β(π) = 1 and R1(π) = π if π ≥ π, and β(π) = (π − πl) / (π − πl) and R1(π) = π if π < π
(e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein 1990; DeMarzo and Fishman 2000). The optimal contract
thus resembles a standard debt contract with face value π and liquidation probability
1−β(π). Consider next centralized borrowing. The firm’s “type” is fully characterized by
the sum ω := π1 + π2, where π1 and π2 are the two first-period cash flows. Again, it is
straightforward to show that the optimal contract has β(ω) = 1 and R1(ω) = 2π if ω ≥ 2π,
and β(ω) = (ω − 2πl) /2(π − πl) and R1(ω) = ω if ω < 2π. The optimal contract is again
a standard debt contract, now with face value 2π and liquidation probability 1− β(ω).
If either π1 ≤ π and π2 ≤ π or π1 ≥ π and π2 ≥ π, i.e., if both cash flows are
either low or high, the refinancing probability under centralized borrowing is identical to
the average refinancing probability under decentralized borrowing, [β(π1) + β(π2)] /2. In
all other (i.e., intermediate) cash-flow states, the refinancing probability is strictly greater
under centralized borrowing. The first type of ineﬃciency, viz., that eﬃcient second-period
investments are not undertaken, is therefore less severe under centralized borrowing.
We can again solve for the value of I at which the investor breaks even. Again, we find
that the second type of ineﬃciency, viz., that positive NPV projects are not financed at
date 0, is less severe under centralized borrowing if and only if the expected refinancing
probability is higher. By the above argument, this is the case if and only if
Pr(πi < π | πj ≥ π) > 0 for i 6= j, (12)
i.e., if there is a nonzero probability that one cash flow is below and the other is above the
mean. Proposition 1 thus extends to arbitrary continuous cash-flow distributions satisfying
(12). If (12) does not hold the organizational structure is irrelvant. Clearly, (12) holds if
the joint distribution F (π1,π2) has full support. Conversely, (12) does not hold if π1 and
π2 are perfectly positively correlated.
No Investor Loss in Second Period
Our result that centralization improves contract eﬃciency does not depend on the fact
that the investor makes a loss in the second period. To see this, denote the verifiable
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second-period cash flow by π0l ≥ πl and the corresponding expected second-period cash
flow by π0 := pπ0l + (1− p)πh. The verifiable first-period cash flow is still πl < I.
As can be shown, centralized borrowing is optimal if and only if
π0l < I + (1− p)(π0l − I)
where the right-hand side is strictly greater than I. Accordingly, Proposition 1 extends
to situations where the verifiable second-period cash flow exceeds the investment cost. (If
the inequality is reversed there is no ineﬃciency: the verifiable cash flow is so large that
− even under decentralized borrowing − the firm is refinanced with probability one).
Nonverifiability of Investment Decisions
Our assumption that investment decisions are nonverifiable is not needed if the parties
can renegotiate after default. Consider a Hart-Moore (1998) type setting where upon
default the investor seizes the assets underlying the project (e.g., a machine). To bring
the story in line with our model, suppose the asset value corresponds to the verifiable
cash-flow component πl. The investor then has the choice between selling the asset on
the market or renegotiating ownership. If the investor sells the asset on the market, he
receives πl. If he sells the asset back to the firm, he receives some price P .
If the asset is sold back to the firm it may be used for another period, where it generates
a nonverifiable return of πl +∆. At the end of the second period the liquidation value is
zero, i.e., there is full depreciation. We shall assume that ∆ > 0, i.e., the asset is worth
more to the firm than to the market, which implies that date-1 liquidation is ineﬃcient.
As Hart and Moore (1998) point out, however, the firm may not have enough funds to
compensate the investor for not liquidating the asset.
Suppose 2 (πh − πl) > πl > (πh − πl) , where the first inequality follows from (A.3).
In this case neither of the two stand-alone firms has suﬃcient funds to buy back the
asset. However, the centralized firm, after earning 2πh but claiming that the cash flow is
2πl, does have suﬃcient funds, which means there will be renegotiation. Depending on the
distribution of bargaining powers and the firm’s liquidity, the outcome of the renegotiation
is that the high cash-flow firm makes an additional net gain of πl + ∆ − P ≥ 0.6 In a
renegotiation-proof contract the investor must therefore pay the high cash-flow firm under
centralized borrowing a greater rent than the two high cash-flow firms under decentralized
borrowing together. Even though investment decisions are verifiable (the use of the asset
in the second period is observable) and the investor can prevent the firm from continuing
6The inequality may be strict even if the investor has all the bargaining power in the renegotiation. For
instance, suppose 2 (πh − πl) = πl+∆/2. In this case, the investor can extract at most half of the surplus
since πl +∆/2 is the most that headquarters can pay.
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by liquidiating the asset, we have again that centralization lowers the investor’s profit in
the high cash-flow state, which is really all that is needed for Proposition 2 to hold.
Renegotiation
While the optimal contract under both centralized and decentralized borrowing entails
ineﬃciencies, there will be no renegotiation on the equilibrium path as the maximum which
the investor can assure in the second period is πl < I. The situation is diﬀerent if the high
cash-flow firm claims that the cash flow is low. Consider, for instance, the high cash-flow
firm under decentralized borrowing. Upon claiming that the cash flow is low, the firm
pays out πl, which implies its remaining cash flow is πh − πl. While this is not enough
to self-finance second-period investment, the firm can renegotiate and ask the investor for
additional funds of I − (πh − πl) < πl. As the investor can assure a date-2 repayment
of πl, he is willing to provide these funds. A similar reasoning holds for the high- and
intermediate cash-flow firm under centralized borrowing. In a renegotiation-proof contract
the investor must therefore pay high- and intermediate cash-flow firms an additional rent.
Besides, however, nothing changes. In particular, as long as the investor has suﬃcient
bargaining power in the renegotiation, the tradeoﬀ is the same as in the monopoly case.7
Competitive Credit Markets
Introducing competitive credit markets mitigates the underinvestment problem but
does not eliminate it. For instance, β (l) is no longer equal to zero but strictly between
zero and one. As our results depend largely on a comparison with this benchmark, they
lose much of their simplicity. Besides, there are no significant changes. In particular, both
the underinvestment problem and the tradeoﬀ analyzed here remain. One minor change
is that the contract between the firm and the investor must be augmented by a seniority
provision (both under centralized and decentralized borrowing). To see this, suppose the
high-cash flow firm under decentralized borrowing defaults and approaches a new investor.
As the firm needs only I − (πh − πl) < πl to finance second-period investment, the new
investor is willing to help out. But this means that the original investor will make a loss. A
seniority provision stating that the firm cannot make a repayment to a new investor unless
it has fully settled its debt with the original investor avoids this problem. As payments
to and from investors are verifiable, this provision is enforceable.
Related Literature
A paper closely related to ours is Stein (1997). In his model winner-picking creates
value even if the financing constraint is unchanged. By contrast, in our model value is only
7 If the firm has all the bargaining power, the investor’s payoﬀ from each project is −I + πl < 0. Hence
financing breaks down completely, much like when there is only a single period.
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created if the financing constraint is relaxed, which is the case if the benefits of cash-flow
pooling outweigh the costs. The costs and benefits of centralization are thus diﬀerent
sides of the same coin. By contrast, in Stein’s model the costs of centralization are loss
of oversight if headquarters oversees too many projects. Finally, in Stein’s model there
is no relation between the productivity of conglomerates and their propensity to access
external finance. By contrast, in our model there is an inverse relation.
Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) also examine the
costs of centralization, but from a diﬀerent angle. Both papers stress the role of power
struggles between division managers and headquarters as a potential source of intra-firm
capital misallocation. In our model there is no intra-firm capital misallocation; the sole
ineﬃciency is that the firm as a whole may not get enough funds. Empirically, both
papers make predictions relating divisional investment to the divisions’ opportunities.
In our basic model opportunities are the same across divisions, which is an assumption
we make to abstract from winner-picking eﬀects. Rather, we make predictions relating
divisional investment to past division cash flows.
Berkovitch, Israel, and Tolkowsky (2000) and Matsusaka and Nanda (2000) also study
the link between internal capital markets and firm boundaries. In the first paper head-
quarters has unlimited funds, which implies financing constraints play no role. The paper
predicts that, under reasonable assumptions, conglomerates have a higher productivity
than stand-alones, which is the opposite of what we predict. Matsusaka and Nanda as-
sume that external finance entails a deadweight loss. In particular, they assume that the
deadweight loss is the same for conglomerates and stand-alones, which is precisely what
we question in this paper. Finally, our paper is not the first to show that cash-flow pooling
may alleviate agency problems. Papers analyzing this are, e.g., Diamond (1984), Li and
Li (1996), and Fluck and Lynch (1999). None of these papers, however, has a tradeoﬀ
where cash-flow pooling has both endogenous costs and benefits at the same time.
4 Which Projects Should Be Pooled?
In this section we examine the decision to pool projects from diﬀerent angles. The empir-
ical implications following from this are discussed in Section 5.
Correlation
We admit arbitrary correlation across cash flows in a given period while retaining the
assumption that cash flows are serially uncorrelated. Denote the correlation coeﬃcient by
ρ. While the optimal contracts under both self-financing and “no self-financing” remain
unchanged, introducing correlation alters the probabilities of the diﬀerent cash-flow states,
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and therefore the investor’s expected payoﬀ. (Intuitively, the optimal contracts remain un-
changed as incentive compatibility and limited liability are both ex-post constraints that do
not depend on the ex-ante probabilities). The new probabilities are p [1− (1− ρ) (1− p)]
for the low cash-flow state, 2 (1− ρ) p (1− p) for the intermediate cash-flow state, and
(1− p) [1− p (1− ρ)] for the high cash-flow state. The Appendix contains a derivation of
these probabilities.
If self-financing is not possible, the result is clear. As centralization has only benefits
but no costs, centralized borrowing is strictly optimal, except when ρ = 1. If ρ = 1 the
probability of the intermediate cash-flow state is zero, and the organizational structure is
irrelevant. If self-financing is possible the result is as follows.
Proposition 3. Suppose (A.1 ) and (A.3 ) hold. Decentralized borrowing is optimal
if ρ ≥ 2/3 while centralized borrowing is optimal if ρ ≤ −1/2. If ρ ∈ (−1/2, 2/3) there
exists a strictly increasing function p (ρ) such that decentralized borrowing is optimal if
p ≤ p (ρ) and centralized borrowing is optimal if p ≥ p (ρ) .
As ρ → 1 the probability of the intermediate cash-flow state goes to zero while the
probability of the high cash-flow state remains positive. Hence centralization has costs
but no benefits. Conversely, if ρ → −1 the probability of the high cash-flow state goes
to zero while the probability of the intermediate cash-flow state approaches one.8 For
intermediate values of ρ we have the same picture as before: while neither organizational
form completely dominates the other, there exists a critical value p (ρ) such that centralized
borrowing is optimal if p ≥ p (ρ) and decentralized borrowing is optimal if p ≤ p (ρ). The
reader may verify from the Appendix that p (0) =
√
2− 1.
High vs. Low Future Profitability
Is conglomeration more beneficial in industries where expected future profits are low
or high? To answer this question, we introduce separate probabilities − and hence prof-
itabilities − for each period. Denote the probability of the low cash flow in period t by
pt and the corresponding expected cash flow by πt. While we no longer assume that the
two periods are the same, we retain the assumption that the two projects are identical.
Heterogeneous project bundles are considered below. We have the following result.
Proposition 4. Suppose (A.1 ) and (A.3 ) hold. If p2 ≤ 1/2 centralized borrowing
is optimal if and only if p1 ≥ (1− p2) / (1 + p2) . By contrast, if p2 ≥ 1/2 centralized
borrowing is optimal if and only if p1 ≥ 1/3.
8Due to the two-point distribution, not all (ρ, p)-combinations are feasible. In particular, if ρ = −1 the
only feasible p−value is p = 1/2, which explains why the probability of the high cash-flow state goes to
zero as ρ→ −1. The set of feasible (ρ, p)-combinations is derived in the Appendix.
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If the first-period profitability is suﬃciently high, centralized borrowing is never opti-
mal. For all other values of p1 there exists a critical p2−threshold such that decentralized
borrowing is optimal if p2 is low and centralized borrowing is optimal if p2 is high. Intu-
itively, if the follow-up investment is unattractive, the incentives to engage in self-financing
are small, implying that centralized firms can be disciplined at a comparatively low cost.
In this case, the benefits of centralization outweigh the costs. By contrast, if the follow-up
investment is attractive, the incentives to engage in self-financing, and thus the bribe that
must be paid to the high cash-flow firm, are high.
Cash-Flow Balancing
The termination threat is based on an exchange: the firm exchanges first-period cash
flow (thereby giving up first-period rents) for second-period continuation rights. The
termination threat is thus most eﬀective if there is a balance between first-period cash
flow and continuation rights. If the continuation value is high but the first-period cash
flow is low, the firm can only buy a small fraction of the continuation rights. Similarly,
if the first-period cash flow is high but the continuation value is low, the firm will only
pay out a small fraction of its cash flow equal to the continuation value. (Centralization
mitigates this problem by raising the continuation value).
The above argument suggests that if projects are strongly front- (high π1 but low
π2) and backloaded (low π1 but high π2), it may be better to pool one front- and one
backloaded project rather than two front- or two backloaded projects. The idea is that
the high cash flow generated by the frontloaded project can be used to buy continuation
rights for the (valuable) second tranche of the backloaded project. This intuition can be
formalized. Suppose the probability of the low cash flow can take two values: pH and
pL, where pH > pL. Frontloaded projects have p1 = pL and p2 = pH , implying that
π1 = πL > πH = π2. Backloaded projects have p1 = pH and p2 = pL, implying that
π1 = πH < πL = π2. The expected two-period cash flow is the same for both projects.
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 5. Suppose (A.1 ) and (A.3 ) hold. If πL − πH is suﬃciently large,
implying that projects are suﬃciently front- and backloaded, it is optimal to pool one front-
and one backloaded project rather than two front- or two backloaded projects.
The result is reminiscent of the portfolio matrix developed by the Boston Consulting
Group in the 1970s. Like here, projects with high short-term cash (“cash cows” in BCG’s
language) are used to finance growth projects. A fundamental diﬀerence is that the port-
folio matrix, like other concepts where internal cash flow is being recycled, rests on the
notion that firms must use internal funds, e.g., because external finance is too costly. By
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contrast, in this paper the recycling channel goes via the external capital market: firms
make repayments and subsequently raise new funds. Balancing cash-flow maturities en-
sures that i) firms are capable of making the repayment, and ii) firms are willing to make
the repayment to safeguard the continuation of profitable projects.
Proposition 5 has implications for investment policy. To maintain a balanced portfolio,
firms may have to forego profitable projects in favor of projects which are less profitable
but have a more favorable cash-flow pattern. To give an extreme example of cash-flow
balancing, suppose there are two kinds of projects: frontloaded projects generating an
expected cash flow of π in the first period and zero in the second period, and backloaded
projects generating zero in the first period and an expected cash flow of π in the second
period. For simplicity, suppose in periods where no cash flow is generated the investment
cost is zero. Both projects are then eﬀectively one-period projects. From Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990) we know that neither the front- nor the backloaded project alone, nor a
bundle consisting of two front- or two backloaded projects, can raise external finance. By
contrast, a bundle consisting of one front- and one backloaded project can raise external
finance if the investment condition (3) holds.
5 Empirical Implications
This section summarizes the empirical implications. The first implication follows directly
from the optimal contract. Consider a low cash-flow project (or division). If the cash flow
of the other project is also low, the refinancing probability is zero. By contrast, if the cash
flow of the other project is high, the refinancing probability is between 1/2 and 1. The
argument for the high cash-flow project is analogous.
Implication 1. Divisional investment is positively related to the cash flow of other
divisions.
Supporting evidence is provided by Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998). Lamont
studies the reaction of US oil companies to the 1986 oil price decline. He finds that a lower
cash flow in the firms’ core business leads to investment cuts in non-oil-related divisions.
Similarly, Shin and Stulz find that the investment of smaller divisions is positively related
to the cash flow of other divisions.
In our model, the fraction of nonverifiable cash flow πh − πl measures the magnitude
of the agency problem between the firm and the investor. If all cash flow is verifiable
there is no value to project pooling. If some, but not too much cash flow can be diverted,
project pooling is unambiguously valuable. Finally, if enough cash flow can be diverted
to self-finance follow-up investments, the value of project pooling declines. All together,
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this suggests a hump-shaped relationship between the magnitude of the agency problem
and the value of project pooling.
Implication 2. Internal capital markets are most valuable if agency problems between
firms and investors are small (but positive), and less valuable if they are large.
The result contrasts with Stein’s (1997) result that internal capital markets are most
valuable if agency problems are severe. The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed.
Consistent with Stein’s argument, Hubbard and Palia (1999) find that the highest bidder
returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s were earned when financially unconstrained
buyers acquired constrained target firms. The authors take this as evidence that capital
markets viewed the formation of conglomerates as a response to the information deficien-
cies of external capital markets, which were arguably greater in the 1960s. On the other
hand, Servaes (1996) finds that conglomerates traded at a substantial discount in the
1960s, which is diﬃcult to reconcile with Hubbard and Palia’s interpretation.
Rather than going back in time, several papers study the value of conglomeration in
countries where capital markets are less developed. Lins and Servaes (2001) obtain a
substantial diversification discount for seven emerging markets countries, which is of the
same order of magnitude as that found by Lang and Stulz (1994) for the US. Similarly,
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999) find no clear pattern of diﬀerent degrees of
diversification across countries at diﬀerent levels of development. Both authors reject the
hypothesis that greater information asymmetries and market imperfections make internal
capital markets more valuable.9
We now come to the core implications of our model. The next two implications relate a
firm’s propensity to access external finance to exogenous characteristics such as operating
productivity and the degree of firm diversification.
Implication 3. Low-productivity conglomerates should have a higher, and high-
productivity conglomerates should have a lower propensity to access external finance than
comparable stand-alone firms.
Implication 4. The propensity of conglomerates to access external finance should be
positively related to their degree of diversification.
Implication 3 follows from the analysis leading to Proposition 2. It derives from a
comparison of the investment thresholds under decentralized and centralized borrowing.
Implication 4 follows from the analysis leading to Proposition 3. Unlike Implication 3,
9Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that Indian firms aﬃliated with highly diversifed business groups
outperform other firms. The authors point out, however, that internal capital markets have nothing to do
with this. Unlike, e.g., Japanese keiretsu, Indian business groups have no common internal capital market.
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it does not compare stand-alones and conglomerates, but conglomerates with diﬀerent
project correlations.
We are not aware of any empirical test of Implication 3. Although Comment and Jar-
rell (1995) and Peyer (2001) both find that conglomerates and stand-alones have diﬀerent
propensities to access external finance, neither paper compares low- and high-productivity
(or low- and high-performance) firms separately.10 Implication 4 seems to be consistent
with the empirical evidence. While Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that highly and
less diversified conglomerates have similar propensities to access external capital markets,
their analysis does not control for internal capital markets eﬃciency. Peyer (2001) refines
Comment and Jarrell’s analysis by discriminating between firms with eﬃcient and ineﬃ-
cient internal capital markets. He finds that − if the internal capital allocation is eﬃcient
(which is the case in our model) − the propensity of conglomerates to access external
finance increases with the degree of firm diversification.
Implications 1-4 are general statements which hold regardless of whether the organiza-
tional form is chosen optimally. The next two implications rest on the assumption that the
organizational form is chosen optimally. Implication 5 is a direct corollary to Proposition
2, which is the central result of our paper.
Implication 5. Conglomerates should on average have a lower operating productivity
than stand-alone firms.
Implication 5 suggests that the diversification decision is endogenous: low-productivity
firms diversify while high-productivity firms do not. There exists strong empirical support
for this argument. Using plant-level data, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) find that − for
all but the smallest firms in their sample − conglomerate firms in the US are less pro-
ductive than single-segment firms. (The smallest size category constitutes 3.3% of their
sample). Similarly, Berger and Ofek (1995) (for the US) and Lins and Servaes (2001)
(for emerging markets countries) find that diversified firms have a smaller operating prof-
itability than stand-alone firms, and Lang and Stulz (1994) find that diversifying firms are
poor performers relative to firms that do not diversify. Finally, Campa and Kedia (1999)
and Graham, Lemon, and Wolﬀ (2001) find that diversifying firms trade at a discount
already prior to the diversification, and that targets in diversifying acquisitions are al-
ready discounted before they are acquired, respectively. Contrary evidence is provided by
Schoar (2000), who finds that plants of diversified firms are more productive than plants
of single-segment firms.
10Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that conglomerates use less external finance than single-segment
firms, although the diﬀerence is small. Peyer (2001) finds that conglomerates with eﬃcient internal capital
markets use more external finance than single-segment firms. Our model would suggest that diﬀerences in
productivity might be able to explain some of the cross-sectional variation in these studies.
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The next statement follows from Proposition 4. It rests on the notion that the in-
centives to engage in self-financing, and hence the costs of centralization, are lower if the
follow-up investment is relatively unattractive.
Implication 6. Compared to stand-alone firms, conglomerate firms should be more
prevalent in slow-growing or declining industries.
Few studies have examined the relation between conglomeration and industry growth.
Consistent with our hypothesis, Lang and Stulz (1994) find that diversified firms tend to
be concentrated in industries with fewer growth opportunities. Similarly, Burch, Nanda,
and Narayan (2000) report a negative correlation between industry conglomeration and
investment opportunities as measured by industry market-to-book ratios.
The last implication follows from Proposition 5. Unlike Implication 6, it does not com-
pare stand-alones and conglomerates, but diﬀerent investment policies for conglomerates.
Implication 7. Conglomerates operating in both growing and declining industries
should have a higher propensity to access external finance than conglomerates operating
either in growing or declining industries.
While based on a diﬀerent logic than models of internal cash-flow recycling, the im-
plications for investment policy are similar: firms should hold a balanced portfolio of
projects generating immediate cash (“cash cows”) and projects generating cash in the
future (“growth projects”). We are not aware of empirical work examining the relation
between financing constraints and the composition of firms’ investment portfolios.
6 Concluding Remarks
Financial contracting models typically consider an entrepreneur who raises funds for a
single project. In this setting, questions regarding organizational structure or the role of
internal capital markets cannot be addressed. On the other hand, internal capital markets
models, while analyzing the choice between centralization and decentralization, do not
consider optimal contracts between headquarters and outside investors. This paper links
both literatures, thereby tying together in- and external capital markets.
We derive the optimal contract for both centralized firms where headquarters borrows
on behalf of multiple projects and decentralized, or stand-alone, firms where individual
project managers borrow separately. Centralization has benefits and costs. On the benefit
side, headquarters uses excess liquidity from high cash-flow projects to buy continuation
rights for low cash-flow projects. This, in turn, allows headquarters to make greater
repayments, which relaxes financing constraints ex ante. On the cost side, headquarters
may pool cash flows from several projects and pursue follow-up investments without having
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to return to the capital market. This makes it more diﬃcult for investors to discipline the
firm in the future, which tightens financing constraints ex ante.
We believe our model yields insights which may be applied to other areas of economics
and finance. By showing that cash-flow pooling can strengthen a firm’s ability to expropri-
ate investors, the paper is one of few papers emphasizing the potential costs of cash-flow
pooling. Other models, especially in the financial intermediation literature, rest largely on
the benefits of cash-flow pooling (e.g., Diamond 1984). Introducing costs in these models
may generate new, interesting insights. Second, internal capital markets, via their eﬀect
on financing constraints, may aﬀect the strategic behavior of firms in the product mar-
ket. For instance, in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) the presence of financing constraints
creates incentives for deep-pocket firms to lower the profits of financially constrained ri-
vals. Forming a conglomerate can reduce financing constraints and therefore competitors’
incentives to prey. Third, internal capital markets may play an important role for the
credit channel and monetary transmission mechanism. In particular, to the extent that
they alleviate credit constraints, internal capital markets may damp the eﬀect of shocks
on business lending and hence stabilize production and economic growth.11
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. It remains to derive the optimal contract under centralized
borrowing given (A.1)-(A.2). The rest follows from the argument in the text.
Instead of solving the problem (4)-(7) we solve a relaxed problem where the global
incentive compatibility constraint (5) is replaced with the downward constraints that nei-
ther type (h, h) nor type (h, l) has an incentive to mimic type (l, l) .We subsequently show
that the solution to this relaxed problem also solves the original problem. In the relaxed
problem the investor solves (4) subject to the limited liability constraints (6)-(7) and the
downwards incentive compatibility constraints
r (s)−R1 (s) + β (s)
h
2π −R2 (s)
i
≥ r (s)−R1 (l, l) + β (l, l)
h
2π −R2 (l, l)
i
,
where s ∈ {(h, h) , (h, l)} . Denote these constraints by C (h, h) and C (h, l) , respectively.
The following two lemmas considerably simplify the analysis.
Lemma. At any optimum it must hold that β (l, l) = 0 and R1 (l, l) = 2πl.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction. Suppose β(l, l) > 0 and define R¯1(l, l) := 2πl
and R¯2(l, l) := R2(l, l) − 2πl + R1(l, l). If β(l, l) < 1 replacing R1(l, l) and R2(l, l) with
R¯1(l, l) and R¯2(l, l) strictly increases the investor’s expected profit, whereas if β(l, l) = 1
11On the macroeconomic implications of credit constraints, see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000).
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replacing R1(l, l) and R2(l, l) with R¯1(l, l) and R¯2(l, l) leaves the investor’s expected profit
unchanged. Moreover, if C(h, h), C(h, l), and the two limited liability constraints are
satisfied under R1(l, l) and R2(l, l), they are also satisfied under R¯1(l, l) and R¯2(l, l).
From the second-period limited liability constraint for type (l, l) it follows that R¯2i (l, l)−
2I < 0. On the other hand, since π¯ − I > 0 and R¯2(l, l) ≤ 2πl it must be true that
2π¯ − R¯2(l, l) > 0. Accordingly, reducing β(l, l) strictly improves the investor’s expected
profit without violating any of the incentive compatibility constraints, which contradicts
the optimality of β(l, l) > 0. Given that β(l, l) = 0 is optimal, the fact that R1(l, l) = 0 is
also optimal is obvious. Q.E.D.
Lemma. At any optimum the constraints C(h, l) and C(h, h) must bind.
Proof. We argue again to a contradiction. Suppose C(h, h) is slack. If β(h, h) = 0
then C(h, h) implies that the first-period limited liability constraint for type (h, h) is
also slack. But this implies that the investor can improve his expected profit by raising
R1(h, h) without violating any constraint, contradiction. If β(h, h) ∈ (0, 1) the unique
optimal payments for type (h, h) are R1(h, h) = πl + πh and R2(h, h) = 2πl. Since we
showed above that R1(l, l) = 2πl and β(l, l) = 0 this violates C(h, h), contradiction.
Finally, if β(h, h) = 1 any optimal contract must satisfy R1(h, h) +R2(h, h) = 2πh + 2πl.
Since 2(πh − πl) > 2(π¯ − πl) this violates C(h, h), contradiction.
Next, suppose C(h, l) is slack. If β(h, l) = 0 the argument is the same as above.
If β(h, l) ∈ (0, 1) the unique optimal payments for type (h, l) are R1(h, l) = πh + πl
and R2(h, l) = 2πl. Observe that if 2β(h, l)(π¯ − πl) ≥ πh − πl this contract is indeed
incentive compatible. Since 2(πl − I) < 0, however, the investor is strictly better oﬀ by
reducing β(h, l), contradiction. Finally, if β(h, l) = 1 any optimal contract must satisfy
R1(h, l) + R2(h, l) = πh + πl + 2πl. In particular, this implies that any optimal contract
yields the same profit to the investor as a contract where R1(h, l) = πh+πl and R2(h, l) =
2πl. As we showed above, however, the investor would then want to decrease β(h, l),
contradiction. Q.E.D.
The first of the above lemmas implies that the lowest type (l, l) receives no rent in
equilibrium. The second lemma is a standard feature of contracting problems of this sort.
Equipped with these two lemmas we can now derive the optimal contract.
Lemma. The following contract is optimal :
1) Type (l, l) : β (l, l) = 0 and R1 (l, l) = 2πl.
2) Type (l, h) : β (h, l) = 1/ [2 (1− p)], R1 (h, l) = πh + πl, and R2 (h, l) = 2πl if p ≤ 1/2,
and β (h, l) = 1, R1 (h, l) = 2π, and R2 (h, l) = 2πl if p ≥ 1/2.
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3) Type (h, h) : β (h, h) = 1, R1 (h, h) = 2π, and R2 (h, h) = 2πl.
Proof. Setting β (l, l) = 0 and R1 (l, l) = 2πl and inserting the binding C(h, l) and
C(h, h) constraints in (4) we can rewrite the objective function as
−2 (πl − I) + 2πl + 4p (1− p)β (h, l) (π − I) + 2 (1− p)2 β (h, h) (π − I) . (13)
By inspection, (13) is strictly increasing in both β(h, l) and β(h, h), implying that the
solution is β(h, l) = β(h, h) = 1 if feasible. If 2π¯ ≤ πh + πl setting β(h, l) = β(h, h) = 1 is
indeed feasible. The optimal payments R1 (h, l) , R2 (h, l) , R1 (h, h) , and R2 (h, h) then
follow from C(h, l), C(h, h), and the respective limited liability constraints.
If 2π¯ > πh + πl setting β(h, l) = 1 violates either C(h, l) or the second-period limited
liability constraint for type (h, l). Accordingly, we must have β(h, l) < 1. Next, observe
that 2π > R2(h, l). To see this, suppose to the contrary that 2π ≤ R2(h, l). Subtracting
the binding C(h, l) constraint from the second-period limited liability constraint for type
(h, l) gives
πh + πl ≥ R2(h, l) + β (h, l)
h
2π −R2(h, l)
i
. (14)
If 2π = R2(h, l) this violates 2π¯ > πh + πl, contradiction. Suppose therefore that 2π <
R2(h, l). Solving (14) for β (h, l) we have β (h, l) ≥ £πh + πl −R2(h, l)¤ / £2π −R2(h, l)¤,
which is strictly greater than one since 2π < R2(h, l) and 2π¯ > πh + πl together imply
that πh + πl < R2(h, l), contradiction. Solving the binding C(h, l) constraint for β(h, l)
we obtain β (h, l) =
£
R1(h, l)− 2πl
¤
/
£
2π¯ −R2(h, l)¤ . Moreover, since 2π > R2(h, l) it
must hold that ∂β(h, l)/∂R1(h, l) > ∂β(h, l)/∂R2(h, l) > 0, implying that both the first-
and second-period limited liability constraint for type (h, l) must bind. Solving the bind-
ing limited liability constraints for R1(h, l) and R2(h, l) we have R1(h, l) = πh + πl and
R2(h, l) = 2πl. Inserting these values in β (h, l) =
£
R1(h, l)− 2πl
¤
/
£
2π¯ −R2(h, l)¤ yields
β (h, l) =
πh − πl
2 (π − πl) =
1
2 (1− p) , (15)
where the second equality follows from the definition of π.
It remains to show that the solution to the relaxed problem also solves the original
problem (4)-(7). Since C(h, l) and C(h, h) are both binding, all other incentive compati-
bility constraints must bind as well, which implies that the solution is globally incentive
compatible. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. It remains to derive the optimal contract under centralized
borrowing given (A.1)-(A.3). The rest follows from the argument in the text.
Lemma. The following contract is optimal :
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1) Type (l, l) : β (l, l) = 0 and R1 (l, l) = 2πl.
2) Type (h, l) : β (h, l) = 1/ [2 (1− p)], R1 (h, l) = πh + πl, and R2 (h, l) = 2πl if p ≤ 1/2,
and β (h, l) = 1, R1 (h, l) = 2π, and R2 (h, l) = 2πl if p ≥ 1/2.
3) Type (h, h) : β (h, h) = 1, R1 (h, h) = 2πh, and R2 (h, h) = π − 2 (πh − πl) + I.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 1 we solve again a relaxed problem. The
corresponding incentive compatibility constraint for type (h, h), which explicitly takes into
account the possibility that type (h, h) can finance one or more second-period projects with
internal funds by mimicking type (l, l), is denoted by C¯(h, h). Type (h, h)’s payoﬀ from
deviating and mimicking type (l, l) is then as follows:
UD(h, h) :=

2πh −R1(l, l) + β(l, l)
£
2π¯ −R2(l, l)¤
+[1− β(l, l)] (π¯ − I)
if I ≤ 2πh −R1(l, l) < 2I
2πh −R1(l, l) + β(l, l)
£
2π¯ −R2(l, l)¤
+[1− β(l, l)] 2(π¯ − I)
if 2πh −R1(l, l) ≥ 2I.
Since R1(l, l) ≤ 2πl the case where 2πh −R1(l, l) < I can be safely ignored as it violates
(A.3). Moreover, the first two lemmas in the proof of Proposition 1 continue to hold (with
C(h, h) being replaced by C¯(h, h)). Since β(l, l) = 0 and R1(l, l) = 2πl, (A.3) implies that
UD(h, h) = 2(πh − πl) + π¯ − I. Similar to the proof of the first lemma in the proof of
Proposition 1, the investor’s objective function can the be rewritten as
−2 (πl − I) + 2p(1− p)β(h, l)2(π¯ − I) + (1− p)2 (2β(h, h)− 1) (π¯ − I) . (16)
Given that (16) is strictly increasing in both β(h, l) and β(h, h) the arguments in the
proof of Proposition 1 extend to the current proof. In particular, the optimal contracts
for types (l, l) and (h, l) are the same as in Proposition 1. Furthermore, we have that
β(h, h) = 1, which, together with C¯(h, h), implies that R1(h, h) = 2πh and R2(h, h) =
π¯ + I − 2(πh − πl). To verify that the neglected incentive compatibility constraints hold,
note that it is impossible for type (h, l) to make a repayment of R1(h, h) = 2πh at date 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. We first derive the joint probabilities for types (l, l),
(h, l), and (h, h) for arbitrary correlation coeﬃcients. Denote the random variables as-
sociated with the two project cash flows by X and Y, respectively. The joint probabil-
ities are then ω := Pr (x = πl, y = πh) = Pr (x = πh, y = πl) , Pr (x = y = πl) = p − ω,
and Pr (x = y = πh) = 1 − p − ω. Since ρ := Cov (X,Y ) /σXσY and σX = σY we have
ρ = 1 − ω/p (1− p) . Solving for ω we obtain the probabilities given in the text. More-
over, since ω ≤ min [p, 1− p] it follows that the correlation coeﬃcient is bounded from
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below by ρ := 1−(min [p, 1− p]) / [p (1− p)] (this function characterizes the set of feasible
(ρ, p)-combinations).
While the optimal contract under centralized borrowing is the same as that derived in
the proof of Proposition 2, the investor’s expected profit has changed as the probabilities
for types (l, l), (h, l), and (h, h) have changed. Inserting the terms of the optimal contract
in the investor’s objective function while taking into account the new probabilities, we then
have that the investor’s expected profit equals 2 (πl − I)+[1− p+ p (1− ρ) (1 + p)] (π − I)
if p ≤ 1/2 and 2 (πl − I) + [1 + 3p (1− ρ)] (1− p) (π − I) if p ≥ 1/2. Comparing these
values with the investor’s expected profit under decentralized borrowing, 2 (πl − I) +
(1− p) 2 (π − I), we obtain the following result:
Lemma. If (A.1 ) and (A.3 ) hold and projects are arbitrarily correlated the compari-
son between centralized and decentralized borrowing is as follows.
1) ρ ∈ (2/3, 1] : Decentralized borrowing is optimal.
2) ρ ∈ (1/3, 2/3] : If p ≤ 1/ [3 (1− ρ)] decentralized borrowing is optimal, whereas if
p ≥ 1/ [3 (1− ρ)] centralized borrowing is optimal.
3) ρ ∈ (−1/2, 1/3] : If p ≤ p (ρ) :=
h
ρ− 2 +p8 + ρ2 − 8ρi / [2 (1− ρ)] decentralized
borrowing is optimal, whereas if p ≥ p centralized borrowing is optimal.
4) ρ ∈ [−1,−1/2] : Centralized borrowing is optimal.
It is easy to check that the functions 1/ [3 (1− ρ)] and p (ρ) are both strictly increasing
and intersect at ρ = 1/3, which completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 2. The
optimal contract under decentralized borrowing is the same as in Section 2, except that
R1 (h) = π2. The optimal contract under centralized borrowing given (A.1) & (A.3) is also
the same as in Section 2, except that R1 (h, l) = 2π2 if p2 ≥ 1/2, β(h, l) = 1/[2(1 − p2)]
if p2 < 1/2, and R2 (h, h) = π2 − 2 (πh − πl) + I. Inserting the optimal contract in the
investor’s objective function, we have that under decentralized borrowing the investor
invests at date 0 if and only if
I ≤ π2 − π2 − πl
2− p1 .
By contrast, under centralized borrowing given (A.1) & (A.3) he invests at date 0 if and
only if
I ≤ π2 − π2 − πl
1 + 2(1− p1)p1 + (1−p1)22
if p2 ≥ 1/2, and
I ≤ π2 − π2 − πl
1 + (1−p1)p1(1−p2) +
(1−p1)2
2
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if p2 ≤ 1/2. Comparing these expressions yields the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. If πL− πH is large we have that pL < 1/2 < pH . Consider
first the investment threshold if either two front- or two backloaded projects are pooled.
From the proof of Proposition 4 we have that
I ≤ πl + (πh − πl)(1− pH) 4(1− pL)pL + (1− pL)
2
2 + 4(1− pL)pL + (1− pL)2 (17)
if two front-loaded projects are pooled, and
I ≤ πl + (πh − πl)(1− pH)2 2pH + (1− pH)(1− pL)
2(1− pL) + 2(1− pH)pH + (1− pH)2(1− pL) (18)
if two back-loaded projects projects are pooled. As pH − pL → 1 the spread πL − πH =
(πh − πl) (pH − pL) widens, and both (17) and (18) converge to πl.
Consider next the investment threshold if one front- and one backloaded project are
pooled. If πL − πH is large we have that πH < I < πL. We first characterize the optimal
contract, where we can build on arguments in the proof of Proposition 2. The contract
with type (l, l) is identical to that in the proof of Proposition 2. Regarding type (h, l), we
can treat the state where the frontloaded project has a high cash flow and the backloaded
project has a low cash flow equivalently to the state where the backloaded project has
a high cash flow and the frontloaded project has a low cash flow. Under the optimal
contract the investor pays I with probability one at date 1, which ensures that the firm
can continue the profitable backloaded project. The optimal repayment is πL at date 1
and πl at date 2. As for type (h, h), the investor pays again I with probability one at date
1. Due to the additional self-financing constraint, however, the investor can extract at
most 2πl at date 1 and zero at date 2. Substituting these specifications into the investor’s
profit function yields the investment threshold
I ≤ πl + (πh − πl)(1− pL) pH(1− pL) + pL(1− pH)
2 + pH(1− pL) + pL(1− pH) ,
which converges to πl + (πh − πl)/3 > πl as pH − pL → 1. Q.E.D.
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